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Abstract
Low-wage labor markets are traditionally viewed as competitive, and the pos-
sibility of strategic behavior by employers is dismissed. However, such behavior
is not impossible. This paper investigates the possibility of tacit collusion by
low-wage employers while setting wages. A game-theoretic explanation along
the lines of the Folk theorem is offered, suggesting that a non-binding minimum
wage may serve as a focal point for tacit collusion, proposing a symmetric solu-
tion to an infinitely played game of wage-setting. Several empirical techniques
were employed in testing the hypothesis, including hurdle models of collusion.
CPS monthly data is used for the years 1990-2005, covering the last four fed-
eral minimum wage increases. The likelihood of collusion at minimum wage is
evaluated, as well as its dynamics during this period. The results generally sup-
port the collusion hypothesis and suggest that employers respond strategically to
changes in minimum wage legislation while using the statutory minimum wage as
a coordination tool in tacit collusion.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: J31, J38, J42, L10
Keywords: minimum wage, low-wage markets, collusion, tacit collusion, fo-
cal points
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1 Introduction
Minimum wage laws have been a hotly debated issue ever since their in-
troduction in the early 20th century. Today their controversy has not di-
minished. Many empirical phenomena attributed to minimum wages still
remain unexplained, triggering the development of new research contribut-
ing to already vast body of literature.
When analyzing the impact of the minimum wage, labor economists in-
vestigate its efficacy in raising earnings of low-wage workers, its effects on
employment, and its overall distortional and welfare effects. When address-
ing these issues, researchers generally refer to the minimum wage as a price
floor, the effects of which greatly depend on the competitive structure of
underlying markets, as well as on whether the minimum wage is binding
(relative to the competitive market wage). However, this traditional inter-
pretation of the minimum wage role is not always successful in explaining
a number of empirical phenomena. For instance, why do hikes in the mini-
mum wage not necessarily reduce employment? Why do wages in low wage
sectors grow more slowly when compared to the rest of the economy? Why
are low-wage employers unwilling to raise wages even when unable to hire?
Or why is the rate of job creation in the low-wage sector generally greater
than the economy’s average?
While keeping in mind these questions, this paper suggests to look at
the role of the minimum wage from a new perspective. It proposes that a
non-binding minimum wage can function as a focal point for tacit collusion
by low-wage employers. A simple theoretical analysis of firms’ wage choice
in a dynamic setting shows that any wage ranging from the monopsony to
the competitive level wage may lead to a stable (but socially inefficient)
equilibrium if chosen symmetrically by employers. A minimum wage, when
falling into this range of wages, can suggest such a symmetric solution, thus
facilitating collusion.
If employers succesfully collude, the labor markets become de facto
monopsonistic and Adam Smith was among the first researchers who men-
tioned this possibility. Manning (2003b:106) writes:
“...monopsony could also occur when there are many employers, but
they collude in wage setting so that there are only a few effective em-
ployers in the labour market. Adam Smith strongly believed that em-
ployer collusion was a frequent outcome in labour markets: we rarely
hear, it has been said, of the combinations of masters, though fre-
quently of those of workmen. But, whoever imagines, upon this ac-
count, that masters rarely combine, is as ignorant of the world as of
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the subject. Masters are always and everywhere in a sort of tacit, but
constant and uniform combination, not to raise the wages of labour
above their actual rate. To violate this combination is everywhere a
most unpopular action, and a sort of reproach to a master among his
neighbours and equals. We seldom, indeed hear of this combination,
because it is the usual, and one may say, the natural state of things,
which nobody ever hears of (Smith, 1986: 169).”
The folk theorem, however, argues against the plausibility of collusion
if employers are unable to coordinate. Schelling (1960) suggested that the
collusion is still possible if there existed a focal point.
The idea that the minimum wage can be used by employers as a tool for
coordination (the focal point) is also not entirely new. During the debates
preceding the introduction of the Fair Labor Standards Act, John L. Lewis,
representing the Congress of Industrial Organizations and the United Mine
Workers of America, expressed concerns that the minimum ‘fair’ wage and
the maximum hours that would be periodically set by the proposed FLS
Board would tend to become the maximum wage and the maximum hours
(Forsythe, 1939)1.
The fact that a salient focal point facilitates tacit collusion in poten-
tially competitive markets is acknowledged in a number of recent interdis-
ciplinary studies in finance and industrial organization. Such focal points
could appear as a result of the government regulations, as in the case of state-
mandated ceilings on credit card interest rates (Knittel & Stango, 2003);
due to the industry standards, as in the case of requirements on stock price
quotations in NASDAQ trades (Christie & Schultz, 1994; Christie, Harris
& Schultz, 1994); or even due to the social norms (e.g., Harvey, 2006) .
This paper expands the list of such interdisciplinary studies by applying the
theory of tacit collusion at the focal point to low-wage labor markets.
The paper also contributes to the minimum wage literature by expanding
the list of possible minimum wage effects. Empirically this is accomplished
through the analysis of the well-documented minimum wage spike, part of
which could be attributed to the employers’ tacit collusion at the minimum
wage.
Thus, the major effect of collusion is lowering of wages to the level of non-
binding minimum. The reader, however, should be cautioned that the goal
of the paper is not to deterministically predict the extent to which wages
are lowered as a result of collusion by low-wage employers facilitatated by
the focal point. The major goal is rather to collect initial empirical evidence
1I thank Prof. Bill Alpert for pointing this out.
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of collusive behavior, to obtain indications of such behavior by analyzing its
effects on the wage distribution.
I find that such indications are present. The number of potentially col-
lusive observations at the minimum wage is responding to changes in the
minimum wage level in the way consistent with theoreitcal predictions: col-
lusion rises upon hikes at the minimum wage. At the same time, colluding
employers are able to raise wages of workers who previously earned minimum
wages, thus reducing the overall extent of collusion. I also obtain evidence
that is consistent with the theory of facilitating factors: employers are more
likely to collude when economic conditons worsen, when the costs of inputs
increase and when the minimum wage hikes are anticipated. Collusion is
likely in larger labor markets and when the real minimum wage erodes.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section surveys the existing
labor literature which findings point towards validity of the collusion hy-
pothesis. The third, theoretical, section brings together the theory of tacit
collusion with the theory of focal points, applying its predictions to the
low-wage labor markets. The fourth section explains the empirical strategy
used in testing the hypothesis. Section five describes the data. Section six
presents the results of empirical estimations, followed by the conclusion.
2 Minimum Wage: Literature and Stylized Facts
The minimum wage and its impact on labor markets has been extensively
studied. Recent minimum wage research is predominantly empirical and
usually looks at its employment effects, as reflected in a review by Brown
(1999). The re-distributive role of the minimum wage is studied less fre-
quently, as pointed out by Freeman: “Most of the analyses of the minimum
wage focus on its unintended employment consequences. The goal of the
minimum wage is not, of course, to reduce employment, but to redistribute
earnings to low paid workers.”
When the re-distributive impacts of the minimum wage are addressed,
they are examined from the standpoint of whether the minimum wage in-
creases earnings of low-wage workers (Meyer & Wise, 1983), aids in combat-
ing poverty (Burkhauser et al., 1996), reduces wage inequality (Dickens et
al., 2004; Teulings, 2003; DiNardo et al., 1996) or possibly affects the entire
wage distribution (Neumark et al., 2004; Lee, 1999; Dickens et al., 1998).
Reconsidering the re-distributive efficacy of the minimum wage from a
new angle poses a question, namely whether the minimum wage may reduce
the wages of the low-paid (which could be realized if a minimum wage is non-
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binding and used by low-wage employers to coordinate their wage-setting).
Stylized facts and selected prior research suggest that both coordination and
non-bindedness of the minimum wage are possible, as evidenced by a large
distributional spike at the minimum wage, wage compression, rising wage
inequality and some other phenomena to be discussed.
Minimum Wage Spike
Perhaps the most important piece of evidence supporting the hypothesis of
tacit collusion is the substantial clustering of wages around the statutory
minimum – the so-called “minimum wage spike.” Brown (1999, p.2143)
summarizes:
“Among those who are employed, the distribution of ln(wage) tends
to look bell-shaped with occasional spikes at round-dollar amounts.
Often there is another spike, at the minimum wage, even when the
minimum is not a round-dollar amount. Spikes at the minimum wage
are stronger when the minimum wage is more binding; e.g. in wage
distributions for teenagers rather than for all workers, and in years
when the minimum wage has been raised rather than after several
years of a constant nominal and eroding real minimum wage.”
Wage information for a subset of retail and food industry hourly paid
employees in October 1996 (an arbitrary choice), when the federal minimum
wage level was $4.75, shows that the minimum wage spike is, indeed, quite
apparent (Figure 1).
Most common explanation of the minimum wage spike is the so-called
‘forced truncation’, suggesting that the minimum wage ‘takes a bite’ from
the underlying wage distribution. Under this explanations some workers
are believed to lose jobs (truncation), but some get their pay raised up to
the minimum wage (censoring). This explanation, however, is challenged
if one assumes that labor markets are competitive. If they were, profit
maximizing employers should not have been able to sustain a mandatory
pay increase, since wages that they were paying were already at worker’s
marginal productivity level. And, consequently, all workers whose wages
were below the new minimum should be have been displaced and truncation,
not censoring, should be observed.
The assumption of competitiveness should also translate into high em-
pirical estimates of elasticity of employment with respect to minimum wage.
However, these estimates are usually modest and applied only to subset of
markets. Researchers report that a 10% hike in the minimum wage reduces
teenage employment by about 1 to 6% and reduces employment of young
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Figure 1: Minimum Wage Spike
adults by about 1% (Burkhauser et al., 1996). Almost no study surveyed by
Brown (1999) reported a significant impact of a higher minimum wage on
adult employment or total employment. Panel data studies also show that
the employment elasticity estimates are small. For instance, Currie and Fal-
lick (1996) using NLSY data estimate that only about 3% of youth are less
likely to be employed a year after a minimum wage increase. Stewart (2004)
using longitudinal data shows that the introduction of the national minimum
wage in the UK did not have significant adverse effects on employment of
any demographic group (adult and youth, men and women).
Thus, it raises a question whether there are any undercurrents in visibly
competitive low-wage markets that would produce such elasticity estimates.
The theory of ‘offsets’ is another common explanation to the existence
of the minimum wage spike. It suggests that competitive firms facing a
higher minimum wage may re-optimize by adjusting non-wage compensation
or increasing workers’ marginal work-load without laying off workers (e.g.,
Wessels et al., 1980; Meyer & Wise, 1983; Alpert, 1986). This is a plausible
explanation, which could contribute to the appearance of the spike. In
fact, the results show that even after correcting for possible collusion, the
spike does not entirely disappear (see Figure 5), and the remaining spiking
could well be attributed to the offsets. At the same time, the spike does
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not disappear completely even when minimum wage is eroded by inflation,
which disagrees with the ‘offsets’ explanation.
Monopsony is another candidate for explaining the minimum wage spike.
Though low-wage markets can hardly be viewed as structurally monopson-
istic, they can become a de facto monopsony if successfully collude.
The recently developed theory of dynamic monopsony (Manning, 2003),
based on the equilibrium search model of Burdett and Mortensen (1998),
states that a monopsony-like equilibrium may arise even in visibly com-
petitive markets due to the existence of search frictions. The theoretical
model of dynamic monopsony, however, is unable to replicate the spike:
“... the equilibrium wage distribution can have no mass points because it
would then pay employers to deviate by paying an infinitesimally higher
wage”(Manning, 2003a, p.327). Still, this theory does not contradict my
proposition. Moreover, search frictions may further facilitate collusion by
restricting already limited range of wage choices for unemployed workers.
Within the dynamic literature, Flinn (2003) was able to obtain a spike
at the minimum wage in a search model with Nash bargaining. The model
assumed that markets are competitive and the minimum wage poses as
a binding constraint in a Nash-bargaining problem. Bargaining, however,
could hardly be a characteristic of low-wage markets.
Other Evidence
The recent literature on employment effects of minimum wages suggests that
the degree of competitiveness could be lower than conventionally believed.
The estimates of employment elasticity with respect to the minimum wage
also suggest that the recent increases in the minimum wage have not been
binding.
A number of empirical studies report negative employment effects of the
minimum wage, reporting reductions in employment of teenagers and youth.
However, they also find that there are no effects on adults (Neumark and
Wascher (1996, 2000), Burkhauser et al. (1996b, 2000)).
Card and Krueger (1995) conduct a series of studies where they argued
that minimum wage increases of 1990’s did not reduce employment, sug-
gesting that affected markets are possibly monopsonistic. The absence of
employment effects suggests that firms were able to raise wages for those
earning the previous minimums, implying that workers were paid below the
value of their marginal contributions in the first place. This could be ex-
plained if the minimum wage were a point of collusion, and its increase
simply shifted the wage mass from one collusive equilibrium onto another.
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Figure 2: Changes in Real Wage for Different Percentiles*
*The State of Working America, 2004/2005
Overall, it is generally agreed that employment effects of the minimum
wage are rather small, as summarized by Brown (1999), who rephrased a
famous saying by Henry Kissinger: “...the debates over minimum wages
were so spirited because the stakes were so low.” Studies both before the
1980s and in the 1990s showed that minimum wages have almost no effect
on employment of adults and only some effect on employment of teenagers
and youth.
Another interesting empirical phenomenon observed in the US labor mar-
kets during the past two decades is the increasing wage inequality between
the low and the high paid workers (e.g., Freeman, 1996; Gottschalk, 1997;
Lee, 1999). Statistics show that real wages of the tenth and twentieth per-
centiles of workers were either falling or stayed the same since the 1970s in
relation to the steadily increasing pay of high-paid workers (see Figure 2).
Skill-biased technological change and declining manufacturing employ-
ment are often named as the driving forces behind the increasing dispar-
ity, as they shift the balance between the supply and the demand for the
low-skilled. However, as some authors caution (e.g., Howell, Duncan, &
Harrison, 1998), the empirical evidence of such a major shift is thin. A non-
binding minimum wage serving as a reference point for wage-setting could
be contributing to the widening gap.
The efficacy of the minimum wage in reducing/contributing to inequality
has been addressed in several recent studies: Neumark et al. (2004), Machin
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et al. (2003), DiNardo et al. (1996), Lee (1999), Teulings (2003). The
authors generally agree that minimum wages positively affect overall wage
levels. However, they also note that, if the minimum wage is not raised
frequently, its wage-lifting role may be diminished. Both Lee (1999) and
Teulings (2003) find that the reduction in the real minimum wage increases
wage inequality. For example, Teulings estimates that “...a 10% reduction
of the minimum wage causes the wage of a worker earning the minimum
before the reduction to fall by 8%”.
The evidence of wage compression that accompanies increases in (in-
troductions of) minimum wages can also be related to the tacit collusion
hypothesis. For instance, Machin et al. (2003) when evaluating the intro-
duction of the national minimum wage in the UK in 1999 showed that, while
it increased wages of the low-paid in the home-care industry, it also caused
greater compression at the bottom of the wage distribution.
To sum up, the evidence of the minimum wage spike, the low estimates
of the elasticity of employment with respect to the minimum wage, the
stagnating earnings of the low-paid and increasing wage inequality, and the
wage compression all point in the direction that tacit collusion of low-wage
employers at a non-binding minimum wage likely occurs.
3 The Theory of Tacit Collusion at a Non-Binding
Minimum Wage
This section outlines a theory of collusion in labor markets by linking the
standard Industrial Organization theory of tacit collusion with the Schelling’s
theory of focal points and applying it to the low-wage markets. A simple
game-theoretic model – one of the possible variants of prisoner’s dilemma
(PD), illustrates the arrival of low-wage employers to the tacitly collusive
equilibrium.
Wage-Setting as a Coordination Game
Suggesting that low-wage employers tacitly collude when setting wages as-
sumes that they play a coordination game.
The assumption of wage-setting (not bargaining) is central for the coor-
dination game to be possible. Wages that are observed in low-wage markets
are often determined exclusively by employers, while employees have little in-
fluence. Since low-wage jobs are assumed to be homogenous, the pay is low,
and the replacement of workers is relatively easy, firms have little incentives
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to invest in search, selection or negotiation of pay for each individual worker.
Therefore, setting wages at some fixed level and waiting for vacancies to fill
could be the best maximizing strategy (and transaction-cost-minimizing) for
low-wage employers.
The fact that the low-wage jobs are homogenous and wage-bargaining
is absent (at least in externally) creates an incentive for employers to co-
ordinate wage-setting. If successful, such coordination may further reduce
transaction costs and increase profits. Studies in industrial organization
have many examples of such coordination in commodity markets: processed
potato markets (Richards, Paterson, & Acharya, 2001), retail gasoline mar-
kets (Borenstein & Shepard, 1996), and timber sales (Baldwin, Marshall, &
Richard, 1997) among others.
Perhaps most relevant to this paper (and inspired by) is the study by
Knittel and Stango (2003), who analyze the likelihood of coordination in
credit cards’ annual percentage rate setting by US banks in the 1980s. Dur-
ing the investigated period, credit cards characteristics were few, enough
to assume homogeneity (APR was the main differentiating characteristic);
supply and demand sides of the market were represented by a large number
of agents. These two conditions should had led to rather fierce competition
among banks. However, the competition failed to emerge, as banks, soon
after the adoption of the legislation which set APR limits (on state-by-state
basis), learned that colluding on mandated rate levels was possible. This had
led to folding of competition on APRs among banks and reflected through
appearance of distributional spikes.
For the wage-setting to be identified as a coordination game, several
other conditions should hold. These conditions include the symmetry of
employers’ preferences and beliefs, the multiplicity of potential equilibria,
and ability of collusive equilibria to be self-supporting (Crawford & Haller,
1990). The symmetry of preferences are self-explanatory: low-wage employ-
ers prefer low equilibrium wages over high, and their wage-setting practices
are often alike so they can be easily inferred by one another. This addresses
the symmetry. In the next section I discuss the multiplicity of potential
equilibria and the sustainability of collusive equilibria.
The Minimum Wage as a Focal Point Equilibrium
in a Two-Firm Wage-Setting Game
A simple two-firm model is offered next to illustrate the idea that tacit
collusion at a non-binding minimum wage is a possible outcome of a wage-
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setting game played by low-wage employers2.
Proposition: If the minimum wage is non-binding, wage-setting employers
will be drawn to set wages at the minimum wage.
Consider a market consisting of two identical firms i and j that operate
in a perfectly competitive product market with product price p. Labor is the
only production input, with the input requirement of one unit of labor per
unit of output. Workers are perfectly substitutable. The marginal revenue
product of labor is assumed constant. The market labor supply is an upward
sloping function of the wage S(w). In this environment, each firm sets the
wage rate equal to the product price and will earn zero profits.
If firms compete in the labor market, a firm that pays a higher wage
would attract the entire market labor force and would produce the entire
market’s output.
Now suppose that the two firms play a repeated wage-setting game in
periods t = 0, 1, T . Let Πi(wit, wjt) be a firm’s i profit at time t, and the
wage it pays to its employees wit . Symmetric notation is used for firm j.
Each firm maximizes the present discounted value of profits
T∑
t=1
βtΠi(wit, wjt). (1)
Both firms discount their one-period payoffs by the discount rate β.
At each date t firms set wages, utilizing the knowledge of histories of
wage-setting, i.e. the firm has a perfect recall of past wages with history
Hit = [(wi0, wj0), (wi1, wj1), ...(wiT , wjT )], where T is the current period.
In a finitely repeated game of wage-setting, this market is drawn to a
Bertrand equilibrium. Thus, in equilibrium the wage rate is equal to a
perfectly competitive wage.
Now, consider a wage-setting game in which the horizon is infinite (T =
+∞). In this case, the Bertrand equilibrium is also a stable solution, but it
is no longer the only possible equilibrium.
Denote wm a monopsony wage, which maximizes monopsony profit
Πm = (p− w)S(w). (2)
Suppose each firm follows a trigger strategy by setting the wage at the
monopsony level wm if in every preceding period the competitor’s wage was
2Here I closely follow Tirole (1988).
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wm. By setting wages at this level, each firm earns half of the monopsony
profits Πm/2. If a firm deviates and pays a higher wage w > wm in one of
the periods, in this period it receives monopsony profit Πm and zero profit
thereafter, since its rival sets the wage equal to the marginal revenue product
of labor forever after the deviation from monopsony wage-setting, according
to the trigger scenario.
Therefore, the trigger strategy will be an equilibrium if
Πm
2
(1 + β + β2 + ...) ≥ Πm, (3)
which is equivalent to having β > 1/2 (where 2 is the number of firms in
the market). In other words, sharing the market and receiving half of the
monopsony profits indefinitely is more attractive to both firms than com-
peting for workers by offering higher wages, as long as the discount rate β
is sufficiently large. Notably, paying monopsony wage is a sustainable equi-
librium even if no explicit coordination between the two firms is observed,
thanks to the threat of zero profits.
The above model is a version of the Folk theorem for repeated games
with application to the labor market. The theorem ascertains that the game
may have multiple equilibrium solutions. That is, the equilibrium wage can
be set anywhere between the monopsony wage wm and the competitive wage
w = p, as long as it is set symmetrically.
Successful wage coordination of cost-minimizing firms can be problem-
atic, especially if the number of firms, as well as the number of possible
equilibria, is large. However, the existence of a focal point can help to solve
this coordination problem.
The minimum wage as a focal point. Coordination in the wage-setting
game and committing to some symmetric wage within the interval w ⊂
[wm, p) is a difficult task for employers since the number of potential equi-
libria is large. As Tirole (1988:247) describes it:
“The supergame theory is, in a sense, too successful in explaining tacit
collusion. The large set of equilibria is an embarrassment of the riches.
Somehow the firms must coordinate on a ‘focal equilibrium’ in order for
the equilibrium to remain attractive. How is this equilibrium chosen?
A selection process often used in the literature makes the assumption
that in a symmetric game the focal equilibrium is symmetric and the
assumption that the focal equilibrium must be Pareto optimal from
the viewpoint of the two firms (i.e., must yield a payoff on the frontier
of attainable set of per-period profits).”
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The concept of a focal point equilibrium was first described by Thomas
Schelling in his famous book “The Strategy of Conflict” (1960). The more
recent literature on focal points includes Binmore and Samuelson (2006),
Janssen (2001), Colman (1997), Crawford and Haller (1990), and some oth-
ers. In his book, Schelling suggests that for parties with common interests
in coordination and without opportunities to do so explicitly, it is logical
to choose a reference point, which would stand out from the multiplicity
of possible equilibria and would be attractive and value-maximizing for the
majority of players.
The choice of a focal point depends greatly on the circumstances and
the environment in which players operate. In Schelling’s terms, players are
scanning the environment looking for a key that makes collusion possible
(1960, p.57):
“Finding the key, or rather finding a key - any key that is mutually
recognized as the key - becomes the key - may depend on imagination
more than on logic; it may depend on analogy, precedent, accidental
arrangement, symmetry, aesthetic or geometric configuration, casuistic
reasoning, and who the parties are and what they know about each
other.”
The successful solution of coordination puzzles depends on the availabil-
ity and the number of focal points, on the number of players, and on the
number of repetitions the game is played. The larger the number of focal
points and/or the larger the number of players, the longer it takes for them
to coordinate on a unique solution. If the game is played repeatedly, as in
the dynamic game described above, it takes less effort to coordinate with
each successive repetition.
Schelling’s concept of a focal point can be directly related to the discus-
sion of the minimum wage. A task of coordination for wage-setting employ-
ers evolves into finding a focal wage, or the Wage, in the range of possible
equilibrium wages, which is acceptable and likely be chosen by other em-
ployers. A non-binding minimum wage can be used as such a focal point
because of its salient location and its promise of the maximal payoffs to
low-wage employers in the dynamic game of wage-setting.
Empirical Implications
Theory and preliminary analysis indicate that tacit collusion by low-wage
employers is possible if they symmetrically decide to set wages at a non-
binding minimum. This section outlines the empirical implications of such
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behavior, including the effects of factors facilitating collusion. The following
section presents quantitative checks of these implications.
Viewing the model presented in the previous section as a variant of
the prisoners’ dilemma, let me separate low-wage employers into coopera-
tors and defectors. Cooperators choose to collude and secure their share
of monopsony payoffs. Defectors, in turn, choose not to collude and re-
ceive monopsony profits in one of the periods, and reduced (or zero) profits
thereafter, since defection triggers competition and reduces all firms’ long-
run profits. In the simple environment outlined in the previous section, a
perfect collusion in every period will result. The real markets are certainly
different at least in one additional dimension – the number of players.
Schelling (1973) describes a multiperson prisoners’ dilemma (MPD) game
that could be useful to the analysis in several ways. First, it allows for im-
perfect collusion, a situation when some employers cooperate while others
defect, an attractive feature most likely found in real world markets. Second,
Schelling’s graphical model can be used in analysis of comparative statics.
According to Schelling, the imperfect collusion is possible due to the
presence of continuous externality which assumes that one player’s decision
to collude increases payoffs of non-colluders. The larger the number of col-
luders, the higher the payoff of a defector. A simple graphical illustration
of an MPD is presented in Figure 3. It depicts representative firm’s instan-
taneous payoff from colluding (lines C) and defecting (lines D) against the
number of colluding firms on the market. The total number of firms is n.
In Schelling’s model the right vertical intercept of D at zero indicates zero
payoffs in case when all firms compete (competitive equilibrium). The left
vertical intercept of C indicates payoffs when all firms collude (cooperative
equilibrium). As evident from the graph, the defectors’ payoff is higher at
all collusion levels, inevitably leading to the competitive outcome. If, how-
ever, there existed a fraction of ‘devoted’ colluders of size k, the partially
collusive equilibrium becomes possible, with payoff Q > 0 to defectors and
zero payoffs to colluders. This parameter k represents the minimum size of
a viable coalition.
The possibility of imperfect collusive outcome is rather relevant in this
case since empirical wage distributions are non-degenerate: neither perfect
competition, nor perfect collusion is observed. I use this assumption in order
to identify potentially collusive wage observations by comparing wages at the
minimum (collusive) to wages above the minimum (non-collusive). However,
one should be warned, as the Schelling’s model suggests, that in case of
imperfect collusion wages paid by defectors will still be lower than perfectly
competitive wages, since defection is defined as a small deviation from the
14
Figure 3: Effect of Higher Cost on Likelihood of Collusion
collusive level pay.
Schelling’s MPD and its graphical representation can be used in order
to illustrate the effects of facilitating factors on the likelihood of collusion.
According to the collusion theory, one of the important facilitating factors
is the cost of inputs (in our case, the cost of other inputs, since labor is
also an input). Increasing input costs by reducing the benefits of defection
increases the attractiveness of collusion.
Denote r as the costs of inputs (other than labor) used in production.
Then, using the formulas from the previous section, the instantaneous payoff
to a defector is Πm = (p − r − w)S(w), while the payoff to a cooperator is
Πm
n (assuming that a deviation from the monopsony wage is infinitesimally
small). A simple algebra shows that as r rises, the payoff to a defector
falls by S(w), and the payoff to a colluder (when all collude) falls by S(w)n .
Graphically, it changes the right vertical intercepts for both curves D and
C, with a larger vertical move for C (prior D0 and C0 are now D1 and C1).
A rising r has important implications that can be traced graphically.
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First, its reduces the difference between instantaneous payoffs for coopera-
tors and defectors. Second, the higher cost makes initial collusion easier –
the minimum size of the viable coalition is now at k1 (compared to prior
k0). As a result, the number of colluding firms increases from p0 to p1. In
our example, the initial number of colluders coincided with the minimum
viable coalition (p0 = k0), but the final number of colluders exceeds the
minimum viable coalition (p1 > k1). Though, the result generally holds for
other initial settings.
This example illustrates how a change in the input costs can affect the
likelihood of collusion, the effects of other facilitating factors can be analyzed
similarly.
Overall, collusion at the minimum wage should have the following em-
pirical general implications, with some mentioned in the first part of the
paper:
• Wage clustering at the minimum. If a focal point facilitates collusion,
extensive clustering of observations at the minimum wage should be
observed. This is the minimum wage spike that was a main motivator
for this paper. The extent of the clustering should be responsive to
changes in the minimum wage levels.
• Lower wages. If employers collude at a non-binding minimum wage, it
reduces wages of affected workers. All things equal, collusion should
lead to lower wages in localities with lower minimums than in localities
with higher minimums. As a result, when minimum wage is raised,
wages of affected workers increase.
• Increasing wages when minimum wage is raised without negative em-
ployment effects. As was already discussed, an increase in the min-
imum wage from one non-binding level to another non-binding level
should increase wages as it re-distributes surplus from employers to
workers without effects on employment.
• Profitability and market entry. Assuming competitive product mar-
kets, which is arguably the case for industries with low wages, high
and persistent profits “...not accounted for by cost or product qual-
ity advantages” could indicate collusion in labor markets(e.g., Porter,
2005). This, in turn, would lead to market entry and higher than
average rate of job creation in the industry .
Though not previously tied to collusion, most of these general empiri-
cal implications consistent with predictions of the collusion theory are well
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documented in the labor literature. Perhaps, the exception would be the
last implication, testing which could be an interesting new avenue for future
research.
In addition to the general implications, the collusion at the minimum
wage should be responding to changes in the following facilitating factors
(similar to Knittel & Stango, 2003):
• Changes in the minimum wage. A higher but non-binding minimum
wage should increase employers’ propensity to collude since deviation
(i.e. paying higher wages) becomes relatively less attractive. A new
minimum wage level can also provide a signal to employers about the
start of new game and as experimental IO literature suggests coop-
erative behavior is more likely during initial stages of multi-period
games. At the same time, a higher minimum will also increase wages
of the low-paid, thus reducing the overall negative effect of collusion
on wages. An eroding real minimum wage, however, should reduce
collusion as deviation becomes more attractive.
• Costs of other inputs. As was discussed above, higher costs of other
inputs facilitate collusion.
• Anticipated hikes in the minimum wage. An announcement of a future
increase in the minimum wage should have similar effects as increasing
costs of other inputs. Thus, one should expect greater collusion prior to
actual changes in the level of minimum wage as employers re-optimize
and take advantage of the previous lower focal point.
• Number of firms in the market. Tacit collusion is easier to sustain
when the number of employers on the market is small ceteris paribus,
since coordination is trivially simpler.
• Firm size may have either a positive or a negative impact on the
propensity to collude. Larger firms enjoying the scale economies have
relatively smaller costs, thus giving them more room for defection. At
the same time, larger firms have longer ‘lives’, making them more in-
terested in the cooperative outcome of the wage-setting game. The
supergame argument also applies if one views larger firms as more vis-
ible market players, which wage-setting practices are easily discovered
(and punished) by competitors.
• Favorable (product and labor) demand conditions. Collusion is more
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Figure 4: Wage Distribution and Collusive Observations
difficult to sustain in periods of high demand due to increased incen-
tives to deviate (Rotemberg & Saloner, 1986).
Though, it would be helpful to test every listed implication, the available
data does not allow to do so. In the next section I define alternative measures
of collusion and outline strategies for testing the empirical implications.
4 Empirical Strategy
The major effect of collusion at a non-binding minimum wage is the re-
duction of otherwise higher wages down to the minimum. Empirically it
observed in the form of excessive clustering the minimum wage spike (Panel
A, Figure 4). Assessing the fraction of minimum wage observations that
are collusive is one way of measuring the effect of collusion. I further refer
to this measure as the ‘effect ’ measure, the formal expression for which is
provided further in (8).
However, prior to observing this effect, there was an act of collusion as
the process of replacing competitive wages with minimum wages. Thus, an
alternative measure of collusion can be formulated as a fraction of collusive
wages within the pool of otherwise non-binding wages, later referred to as
the ‘cause’ measure. Panel B of Figure 4 illustrates this measure as a ratio
of shaded area within the entire area of the wage distribution above the
minimum wage, with formal expression given further in (9).
While I estimate both measures of collusion, I built upon Knittel and
Stango (2003) who estimate hurdle models of collusion (also known as p-
Tobit) to evaluate the propensity to collude by employers with competitive
level wages above the minimum, i.e. the ‘cause’ measure. I also expand
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their empirical method (mainly due to data issues) by adding truncated
regressions to evaluate both the cause and the effect measures, and add
probit models to test the theory of facilitating factors.
When estimating p-Tobit models two requirements should be met. First,
the distribution requires clear-cut censoring. Second, it is assumed that the
rest of the distribution is not contaminated by processes generating the spike,
which is necessary if one needs to compare spike and non-spike observations.
The first requirement is not met since empirical wage distributions have
wage observations below the minimum wage due to non-compliance or sub-
minimum wage provisions. Second, I argue that the wage observations near
the minimum wage (which acts as a focal point for tacit collusion) are very
likely affected, i.e. adjacent wages are also lower than the competitive level
wages if the game of wage-setting played by employers is to arrive at the
Nash equilibrium. It has been also noted in the literature (e.g., Flinn 2003 &
others)) that extensive clustering exists not only at the minimum wage, but
also at nearby round amounts, that could be also examples of focal points
(though obviously inspired by the mail focal point – the mandated minimum
wage).
A variant of p-Tobit used by Knittel and Stango can still estimate the
extent of collusion relatively precisely, if one has a comparison group of
unaffected markets. The model then can identify the collusive observations
by comparing them against the upper tail of own distribution as well as
against the desired comparison group. However, it is very difficult to find
such a group of unaffected, but relevant labor markets in the US, since
most of the US industries are required to comply with the minimum wage
laws. Moreover, even the exempt markets, such as the agricultural industry
exhibits sizeable spike (e.g., Moertti & Perloff, 2000) at the minimum wage,
which in my view questions the degree to which these markets are unaffected.
These limitations have lead to a deviation from the original empirical
approach of Knittel and Stango. The major part in discerning collusive
minimum wage observations is obtaining the correct wage schedule. As-
suming that collusion is imperfect (as in MPD model discussed above), the
existing non-minimum-wage observations can provide enough information
in order to estimate the ‘correct’ wage equation. I refer to this assumption
when estimating both a reduced variant of p-Tobit model and truncated
regressions. It is useful, however, to start the discussion of empirics with
the formulation of p-Tobit since it outlines the basic maximum likelihood
function used in both cases.
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Basic P-Tobit Model
The p-Tobit can help to evaluate the likelihood of collusion at a non-binding
minimum wage by the means of maximum likelihood. It is built upon Tobit
with an extra estimated probability parameter p that denotes the fraction
of minimum wage observations for which minimum wage is non-binding.
Next, I define a likelihood function that is used to estimate the parameter
p, following closely the specification by Knittel and Stango (2003).
The reduced form wage equation (the latent wage) in the absence of
collusion and minimum wage restriction is:
w∗it = Xitβ + µs + ηt + eit, (4)
where:
Xit – is a set of worker characteristics;
µs – is a set of state fixed effects;
ηt – is a set of time-period fixed effects;
and eit – is an error term, N(0, σ2).
The list of variables included in the vector X of worker characteristics is
given in Appendix 2.
A minimum wage censors the wage distribution according to the follow-
ing schedule:
wit =
{
w∗it if w
∗ > Mst;
Mst if w∗ ≤Mst,
where Mst – is a minimum wage in state s at time t. Note the censoring,
not the truncation, allowing to bring wages below the minimum up to the
minimum. Thus, the probability of observing wage that is equal to the
minimum wage is:
P (wit =Mst) = P (w∗it ≤Mst) = P (εit ≤ (Mst −Xitβ − µs − ηt)) =
= Φ
(
Mst −Xitβ − µs − ηt
σ
)
.
With allowance for censoring, the likelihood function is a simple Tobit:
L =
∏
wit=Mst
Φ
(
Mst −Xitβ − µs − ηt
σ
) ∏
wit>Mst
1
σ
φ
(
Xitβ + µs + ηt −Mst
σ
)
.
(5)
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Introducing an indicator of collusion:
cit =
{
1 if an employer colludes;
0 otherwise.
With collusion, the observed wage schedule becomes:
wit =

w∗it if w
∗
it > Mst and cit = 0;
Mst if w∗it =Mst and cit = 0;
Mst if w∗it > Mst and cit = 1.
The likelihood function becomes:
L =
∏
wit=Mst
[
Φ
(
Mst −Xitβ − µs − ηt
σ
)
+ pΦ
(
Xitβ + µs + ηt −Mst
σ
)]
∏
wit>Mst
(1− p) 1
σ
φ
(
Xitβ + µs + ηt − wit
σ
)
,
(6)
which is the basic p-Tobit, in which p measures the conditional probability
of collusion when minimum wage is non-binding. It represents a fraction of
wage observations for which the latent wage is above the minimum, but the
actual wage is the minimum.
The evaluation of the likelihood of collusion by means of p-Tobit would
benefit from inclusion of a comparison group of unaffected/non-covered mar-
kets. If the indicator of coverage is:
Icovit =
{
1 if a worker employed in covered sector;
0 otherwise,
then, the observed wage schedule becomes:
wit =

w∗it if w
∗
it > Mst, Iit = 1 and cit = 0;
w∗it if Iit = 0 and cit = 0;
Mst if w∗it =Mst for ∀Iit;
Mst if w∗it > Mst and cit = 1.
Incorporating the latter into the likelihood function produces:
L =
∏
Icov=1
[
∏
wit=Mst
(
Φ
(
Mst −Xitβ − µs − ηt
σ
)
+ pΦ
(
Xitβ + µs + ηt −Mst
σ
))
∏
wit>Mst
(1− p) 1
σ
φ
(
Xitβ + µs + ηt − wit
σ
)
]
∏
Icov=0
1
σ
φ
(
Xitβ + µs + ηt − wit
σ
)
(7)
21
Figure 5: Actual and Predicted Wages
Again, in equation (7) p stands for the conditional probability of tacit col-
lusion when the minimum wage is non-binding in the covered sector. It
assumes that the non-covered sector is unaffected by collusion.
However, as was discussed before, it is difficult to locate an unaffected
market in the US. Thus, I estimate the first variant of p-Tobit without
division by coverage as in (6)3.
Alternative Estimation Technique: Truncation
One of the problems associated with empirical wage distributions in the
low-wage sectors supposedly affected by collusion at the non-binding min-
imum wage is the likely contamination of nearby wages. Wage histograms
show that the spiking occurs not only at the minimum wage but within a
larger interval surrounding it (see Figures 1, 5). This spiking can corrupt
the accuracy of estimates obtained in p-Tobit regressions that analyzes the
minimum wage spike exclusively, thus potentially creating a downward bias.
3In the previous version of the paper I have attempted to circumvent the problem by
splitting the sample into two groups and censor only one of them, estimating the variant
of p-Tobit specified in (7). This utilizied information about the actual number of below-
the-minimum wage observations. The obtained then estimates of p were actually higher
than currently reported.
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On the positive side, there is enough of non-minimum wage information,
that combined with available computing power can estimate wage equations
by means of maximum likelihood rather accurately, which then can be used
to predict wages of those currently earning the minimum.
Thus, I estimate a series of ML truncated regressions (also known as two-
limite Tobit) in order to reduce potential contamination and to obtain a wage
sample that is closer to the competitive. I then use the modified sample in
order to estimate a wage equation to predict wages of those currently earning
the minimum. This allows to obtain the ‘effect’ measure of collusion:
Effect Measuret =
∑N
i=1 I((wit =Mit) ∩ (wˆit > Mit))∑N
i=1 I(wit =Mit)
. (8)
In the equation (8) wˆit is the predicted wage based on estimates of an
ML truncated regression, the likelohood function for which is nested within
the previously specified p-Tobit model (e.g., the part of the expression (5
corresponding to data points wit > Mit).
In order to obtain the ‘corrected’ wage sample I initially truncate the
wage data (restricted to hourly paid workers) at the 25th percentile for
each of the analyzed periods4 and estimate the maximum likelihood trun-
cated regression (also known as two-limit Tobit). Procedure of this sort
invokes a response variable based selection (∼ selection on dependent vari-
able, Wooldridge 2002:558). The maximum likelihood method explicitly
accounts for this type of selection since it estimates wage equation condi-
tional on the set of regressors X as well as on the specified selection rule:
c1 < w < c2(∞) (where c1 is the specified cutoff limit). The resulting con-
ditional expectation of w depends not only on X ′β, but also on the inverse
mills ratio that takes into account the selection rule. Thus, one is able to
obtain the set of estimates that is not biased by the selection.
After estimating the ML truncated regressions using the initial selection
rule, I use its results to predict wages of workers who earn wages within
the 50-cent range from the original cutoff point. If the predictions are sig-
nificantly lower (in the statistical sense) than actual wages, the actuals are
substituted by the predictions. I then proceed to establish a new cutoff
point, down an additional 50 cents, and estimate the ML truncated regres-
sion using this larger set of the data (utilizing the imputated wages). I repeat
this procedure until the wages below the minimum are reached. Figure 5
illustrates the extent to which the original wage sample was modified when
4Examination of data on wage growth by percentiles, an illustration of which is provided
in Figure 2, suggests that the lower percentiles of wage distribution are most likely affected.
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80% lower confidence interval rule is applied (October 1996, an arbitrary
choice).
As truncated regressions allows to determine the number of minimum
wage workers whose wages are significantly below the predictions, a ‘cause’
measure of collusion comparable to the original p-Tobit’s p can be evaluated
according to the formula:
Cause Measuret =
∑N
i=1 I((wit =Mit) ∩ (wˆit > Mit))∑N
i=1 I(wit > Mit) +
∑N
i=1 I((wit =Mit) ∩ (wˆit > Mit))
,
(9)
where N is the number of workers and wˆit is the lower confidence interval
for the wage prediction.
Although this ‘cause’ measure of collusion is comparable to the p-Tobit,
one should expect the divergence in the actual estimates, since the models
utilize different sets of information.
Is it Collusion? Probit Model
The results of truncated regressions, by providing an indication whether a
minimum wage observation could be a result of collusive wage-setting, were
also used in testing the theory of facilitating factors. The approach I take is
somewhat similar to the analysis of the second hurdle in the ‘double-hurdle’
model of Cragg (1971), in which the contribution of various factors to the
probability of crossing the ‘hurdle’ are evaluated.
The probit model estimations are based on the following equation:
yit = Zitγ + νit, (10)
where yit is the indicator of collusion; Zit is the vector of facilitating factors;
and νit is an error term, N(0, σ2ν).
The following schedule describes values taken by the dependent variable
and the selection of observations into the probit estimations:
yit =
{
1 if wˆit > wit & wit =Mit;
0 if wit > Mit & wit < maxi,t{wˆit · I(yit = 1)},
where wˆit is the predicted wage based on truncated regression results. The
choice of observations is also illustrated in Figure 6, where the shaded area
in the center segment represents the potential location of collusive min-
imum wage observations. Thus, the probit regression by comparing the
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Figure 6: Choice of Observations for Probit Regression
non-collusive observations to the collusive observations with equal predicted
wage values, allows to identify what factors are contributing to collusion,
i.e. tests the theory of facilitating factors.
5 Data
Data used in the paper is monthly Current Population Survey earnings ex-
tracts prepared by the NBER (MORG files). Variables included in the
MORG extracts reflect workers’ earnings, industry, occupation, education,
unionization, as well as some background variables: age, sex, race, ethnicity,
geographic location, etc. Sixteen years of CPS were used in the estimations,
1990 through 2005, a period that covers the last four federal minimum wage
increases and indicates extensive variation in states’ own minimum wage
levels.
State and the federal minimum wage data used is given in Appendix 1
(US Department of Labor data on minimum wages combined with annual
surveys of states’ labor legislation published in Monthly Labor Review an-
nually). Necessary for testing the theory of facilitating factors, additional
information merged with the original sets: state level monthly unemploy-
ment rates (source: US DOL); monthly CPI indices in order to calculate real
minimum wages and monthly prime interest rates (source: St.Louis Fed).
Hourly paid employees’ data was used only since the study needed the
exact values of hourly wages, and minimum wages in most cases during the
investigated period had not been a round amount. Calculation of hourly
wages based on weekly earnings data would not have provided the necessary
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information. Hourly employees are also the primary category of interest
since hourly employees are the directly affected group by the minimum wage
legislation.
Minor data cleaning was performed. Workers’ records satisfying the
following conditions were excluded: reported as being a member of the full-
time labor force, but no work hours; weekly earnings were less than $100;
hourly wages lower than $1. All workers older than 75 years were excluded.
6 Estimation and Results
The Extent of Collusion: Truncated Regressions and P-Tobit
Tacitly collusive behavior is difficult to detect, especially in visibly com-
petitive markets such as the low-wage labor markets, where the number of
workers and employers is large. Thus, one need to have several pieces of
evidence pointing towards existence of collusive trends.
The major effect of collusion at a non-binding minimum wage serving
as a focal point is the reduction of wages to the minimum from otherwise
higher levels. The results of both truncated regressions and p-Tobit indicate
that it exists, it is persistent, and exhibits cyclicity visibly related to shifts
in minimum wage levels.
A couple of comments on estimation procedure. The consecutive esti-
mation of truncated regressions, as it allowed to evaluate the initial ‘cause’
and ‘effect’ measure of collusion, also prepared data for p-Tobit estimation.
Truncated regression models were estimated on average 14 times for each
of the 192 months of data (16 years). Wages at the point of initial trun-
cation (at 25th percentile of hourly wage distribution) ranged from $8.50
in 1990 to $12.50 in 2005. Wages of workers within the lowest quartile
and earning less than the lower 80% confidence interval of its forecast were
imputed5. As a check of robustness, I run a series of ML truncated re-
5The computation of confidence intervals was done using the standard error of the
forecast, which is significantly larger than the more common standard error of the predic-
tion. Since I impute wages for workers originally not in the estimation sample, using the
forecast SE is more appropriate. To illustrate the difference between the two, consider the
results of regression for January 1995 truncated from the left at $9. The average log-wage
for the interval $8.50-8.99 is equal 2.172, with the average forecasted log-wage is 2.396.
The average standard error of the prediction is 0.071, which gives the lower 99% CI for
the predicted log-wage equal to 2.213. The average standard error of the forecast is 0.433
(six times larger than the prediction SE), which gives the lower 80% CI of the forecast
equal to 1.841 Using the more stringent criteria for the imputations allows to flag wages
of workers only significantly smaller than their predictions as potentially collusive with a
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gressions by restricting the data to the second quartile of hourly employees
only. The results were similar, and in a number of instances the obtained
earnings function coefficients predicted even higher wages. All estimates are
heteroscedasticity-corrected, as tests suggested that this problem is present
in the data.
The monthly estimates of potential collusion based on the ML trunca-
tion regressions are presented in Appendix 3, which includes two sets of
tables: one for the states that follow the federal minimum wage regulation
consistently throughout the estimation period, and the complementary set
of states with own minimum wage laws (see the list of states in Appendix
1).
As collusion theory predicts, substantial clustering of wages at the focal
point is observed. Figure 7 shows the fractions of minimum wage observa-
tions (+50 cents) within the lower quartile of hourly wages – the relative
hight of the minimum wage spike. It is apparent from the graph that the
clustering increases following the hikes in the minimum wage in 1990–1991
and 1996–1997, with the federal MW states being more affected. The next
question is: how many of these observations are actually collusive?
Figure 8 presents the results on the cause measure of collusion6. As the
pattern of change in this measure is rather similar to the spike measure,
it suggests that response of employers to the changes in the minimum is
consistent and somewhat deterministic.
This result provides initial empirical evidence on prediction that a higher,
but non-binding, minimum wage increases propensity to collude since bene-
fits of deviation are smaller. This is true when considering subsets of states
separately. A substantive increase in the minimum for the federal MW states
causes collusion to increase, and makes the period of cooperation relatively
longer (at least in the 90s). For the subset of states with own minimum
wages, hikes in the minimums in 2000s contributed to greater collusion,
while the remaining states exhibite greater degree of deviation from the
collusive path.
Howver, on average 3.81% of otherwise higher wage observations within
the lowest quartile are drawn to the minimum in the states with federal
MW, versus 3.63% in the states with own MW regulation, with the latter
being more volatile.
certain degree of confidence.
6I report the ‘cause’ measure estimate of collusion by relating collusive minimum wage
observations to the lower quartile of wages for ease of presentation. Extending the number
of observations to include the upper quartiles will proportionately reduce the fractions
without affecting the overall pattern.
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Figure 7: Minimum Wage Observations
Figure 8: Truncated Regression Results (1)
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Note also that the pattern of change in the size of the MW spike (up-
per figure) resembles the ‘cause’ measure of collusion (lower figure) rather
closely, though not identically. This suggests there is dependence between
the two. Estimating the coefficient of correlation between these two indica-
tors confirms it. The coefficient of correlation between the size of the MW
spike and the cause measure of collusion is 0.719 for the subset of states
with the federal minimum and 0.478 for the other states. This suggests that
the formation of the minimum wage spike could be largely due to collusive
dynamics, and more so in the states with a stable focal point – the ones
following the federal minimum wage law.
Assessing the ‘effect’ measure allows to unveil another empirical impli-
cation: if collusion at the non-binding minimum wage takes place then a
higher minimum wage should increase wages of workers previously affected
by collusive wage-setting. Figure 9 and Appendix 3 present the results. The
graph demonstrates that the fraction of minimum wage observations that
are collusive drops following the hikes in the minimum wage. Following the
federal minimum wage increases of 1990–91 the share of potentially collu-
sive wages was declining for about two years. It reached a local peak in the
1996, immediately before another federal minimum wage hike. After the
subsequent increase in 1997 this collusion measure declined for another two
years, then steadily climbed (for the states with the federal minimum).
As the real minimum wage erodes and more employers defect from the
collusive path, workers who still earn the minimum represent a proportion-
ately larger fraction, reflected by increasing effect measure. This estimates
reach levels as high as high as 40% of all minimum wage workers in the
states with federal minimum (April 2004). Nevertheless, among those who
earn the minimum the average fraction of potentially collusive is larger in
the states with the higher minimum: 19.20% versus 19.05%.
Thus, the cause and the effect measures of collusion obtained by estimat-
ing truncated regressions provide evidence consistent with the predictions
of collusion theory. The results suggest that workers earning the minimum
wage are consistently underpaid when compared to workers with similar
characteristics up along the distribution.
P-Tobit regression results provide additional evidence in support of col-
lusion hypothesis. Estimation of p-Tobit required clearcut censoring, which
I force. This has lead to the inclusion of below-the-minimum wage obser-
vations, which was not used in the case of truncated regressions. Thus,
the spike becomes artifically larger, and the results of the two estimation
methods cannot be compared directly. In addition, I delete observations for
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Figure 9: Truncated Regression Results (2)
the food industry adult employees who report hourly wages below the man-
dated minimum (21 years and older, since this subgroup of workers is most
likely to earn tips while working in food establishments that serve alcohol).
Deletes represented on average 0.4% of the sample.
Additionally, when estimating the likelihood of collusion by p-Tobit I
pool monthly data into annual sets (factoring out state and month fixed ef-
fects). As a result, the obtained probability parameter measures the annual
average estimate of potential collusion, similar to the ‘cause’ measure. Re-
gressions were estimated using the data for the full sample of hourly workers
and the subsample of workers employed in states with the federal minimum.
All estimates were heteroscedasticity corrected, with robust standard errors.
The results are reported in Table 1 and in Figure 10. Note that unlike the
reported cause and effect measures calculated based on truncation results,
the results on p-Tobit use a different reference scale: the entire wage distri-
bution instead of the lower quartile.
The p-Tobit results show that the pattern of collusion is generally pre-
served. The estimates of p (roughly equivalent to the ‘cause’ measure) show
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Table 1: P-Tobit Results
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
All hourly employees
Estimate of P† 0.050 0.052 0.060 0.050 0.126 0.142 0.137 0.147
Robust SE 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.015 0.015 0.024 0.028
% obs at/below MW 2.44 3.10 2.71 2.34 2.95 2.47 2.51 3.49
Coll. obs/MW obs
(‘Effect’ measure equivalent) 2.11 1.73 2.30 2.19 4.75 5.39 6.41 4.41
Hourly employees in states with federal minimum wage
Estimate of P 0.039 0.047 0.056 0.046 0.102 0.130 0.151 0.121
Robust SE 0.011 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.019 0.020 0.031 0.033
% obs at/below MW 2.85 3.72 3.04 2.56 3.34 2.67 2.70 3.55
Coll. obs /MW obs
(‘Effect’ measure equivalent) 1.39 1.28 1.90 1.83 3.29 5.43 6.39 3.75
N1 107425 104517 103584 102177 101429 101940 91461 92954
N2 59642 58673 58983 58698 58164 58705 52304 52970
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
All hourly employees
Estimate of P 0.147 0.124 0.114 0.101 0.139 0.183 0.162 0.145
Robust SE 0.017 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.014 0.017 0.016 0.016
% obs at/below MW 3.32 2.54 2.01 1.85 1.78 1.97 1.86 2.23
Coll. obs/MW obs
(‘Effect’ measure equivalent) 4.99 5.44 6.29 5.97 8.89 11.13 10.20 7.45
Hourly employees in states with federal minimum wage
Estimate of P 0.161 0.112 0.106 0.090 0.127 0.184 0.127 0.120
Robust SE 0.24 0.019 0.018 0.015 0.018 0.022 0.019 0.019
% obs at/below MW 3.36 2.41 1.68 1.37 1.30 1.46 1.34 1.33
Coll. obs /MW obs
(‘Effect’ measure equivalent) 5.53 5.10 6.91 7.12 11.03 15.24 10.66 10.16
N1 92978 93889 94229 100060 106659 105138 103411 104684
N2 53139 53813 53805 55952 59405 58711 57657 57390
†Estimates multiplied by 100 since P is small. All significant at 1% level.
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Figure 10: P-Tobit Regression Results
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the collusion intenisfies prior to the minimum wage hikes (clearly so for
the 1996–1997 increases). The annual average p for the full sample is esti-
mated at 0.12% of all hourly workforce (fraction of minimum wage earners
whose wages are affected by collusion within the entire pool of non-minimum
wages), and actually lower at 0.11% for the subset of states with the federal
minimum. One can also observe that collusion decreases as the minimum
wage erodes. This again is consistent with the theoretical predictions.
The graphs also reveal a new spike: the estimates of p increase dra-
matically following the recession of 2001. This reiterates the conclusion of
Rotemberg and Saloner (1996) that collusion is more difficult to sustain
during periods of high demand and easier during economic downturns. This
additional spike, however, is most likely generated due to relative increase
in the number of workers earning wages below the minimum that truncated
regression did not account for. Perhaps, this indicates some new dynamics
in low-wage sectors, analysis of which is out of scope of this paper.
Overall, the results of both p-Tobit and truncated regressions provide
meaningful statistical evidence indicating some trends in wage-setting be-
havior that is consistent with prediction of collusion theory.
One possible argument may arise pointing that the regressions did not
account for some unobservable characteristics common to minimum wage
workers that might be driving the results. This possibility cannot be en-
tirely ruled out. However, the fact that the identical estimation procedure
was consistently applied to all sets of data allows to assume that the rela-
tive impact from omitting possible unobservables would be similar. Thus, a
somewhat continuous pattern of collusive shares and its rule-like responses to
changes in the minimum wage suggests that low-wage employers act strate-
gically when setting wages.
Probit Model: Test of Facilitating Factors
The next step in the empirical investigation of the collusion is to test the
theory of facilitating factors. I use probit regressions, pooling cross-sections
of monthly data into a single data set, with a dependent variable indicating
whether a wage observation is collusive based on truncated regression results.
The process of selecting the observations is explained in section 4.
Constrained by the available data, the following variables were included
as proxies for the facilitating factors:
• A set of variables indicating time periods since/until changes in the
minimum wage level. These variables indicate the effects of ‘changes-
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in-minimum-wage’ factors discussed in the section on empirical im-
plications. Minimum wage hikes are predicted to facilitate collusion
either due to the greater overall bindedness, or due to its signalling
role indicating the start of a new cooperation game. It is reasonable
to expect that the relationship between the time elapsed since/until
the latest minimum wage hike and the probability of collusion is non-
linear. Thus, I create a set of binary variables by grouping observa-
tions according to the time period relative to the next minimum wage
change: the actual month of minimum wage change, 2 to 6 months
since/until the change, 7 to 12 months since/until the change, and
more than 12 months since/until the change.
• A variable ‘wages of college graduates’ is chosen as a proxy for ‘costs of
other inputs’, another facilitating factor. The variable was constructed
using the information available in the CPS. I divided the respondents
into age groups unique for each state and month. Respondents aged
from 15 to 65 years old were split into 10 five-year age intervals. Aver-
age ages for college graduates were then calculated wages for each age
group. The wages of both hourly and non-hourly workers with college
degrees were used. A positive coefficient on this variable is expected
since higher input costs increase the attractiveness of collusion.
• The monthly prime interest rate is chosen as an alternative proxy for
costs of other inputs, in this case the cost of capital. Positive coefficient
is expected.
• Monthly state unemployment rates were included as a proxy for de-
mand conditions with a purpose of testing another empirical impli-
cation: in periods of high demand collusion is less likely. I chose to
include unemployment rates that are not seasonally adjusted, as able
to fully reflect variation in local labor market conditions. A positive
coefficient is expected, since poor market conditions increase incentives
to cooperate.
• Two proxies for the number of firms in the labor market were entered:
a ‘central city’ dummy and a ‘metropolitan area, not central city’
dummy (compared against rural areas). These variables were chosen
as proxies for the number of firms in the market. All things equal,
rural areas should exhibit greater cooperation, as number of employers
in the market is the smallest. Thus, the negative coefficients for the
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included variables are expected, with marginally smaller coefficient for
metropolitan area (not central city)7.
• A dummy for the state that follows the federal minimum wage regu-
lation was also entered as a proxy for stability of the focal point.
In addition to the listed above, I include the minimum wage and the
real minimum wage variables. As was already discussed, a higher minimum
wage as it leads to greater collusion also brings wages of previously affected
closer to the competitive level.
The results of probit regressions are reported in Table 2. Five different
specifications were estimated.
The signs of the slope coefficients are generally consistent with theoretical
predictions. The estimates on the set of dummy variables indicating the
responsiveness of propensity to collude to changes in the minimum wage
change confirm that collusion is reinforced when minimum wage is raised,
or the raise is unticipated. The coefficient on the ‘month of minimum wage
change’ variable is positive and significant, and its contribution to the overall
probability is the largest among time variables.
The next time variable having the largest marginal effect on propensity
to collude is the dummy indicating the coming minimum wage hike – 2 to
6 month until. The coefficients are positive and significant as expected,
indicating that employers respond positively to the upcoming change, as it
is equivalent to the cost increase, or can be alternatively viewed as a signal
to starting a new game. Note that the meaning of this coefficient is that
employers are more likely to collude at the ‘old’, not the new minimum wage,
if the shift in the minimum is unticipated.
As a new minimum wage law take effect, employers are more likely drawn
to the focal collusive path, however this effect diminishes the longer the
time period since the change. This is reflected in the positive but small (in
specification 3) or insignificant coefficients on variable ‘7 to 12 month since
the hike’. Note that all coefficients are relative to the excluded category –
‘13 and more months’.
Wages of college graduates used as a proxy for costs of other inputs also
confirm the predictions of the theory of facilitating factors. The estimated
coefficients are positive, supporting the prediction that higher costs lead to
greater collusion. The coefficients are significant for all model specifications
and their values are robust to changes in specifications.
7I thank Dan Hammermesh for his suggestion to make such comparison in order to
identify collusion.
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In the specification 5 I use another proxy for the input costs – the
monthly prime interest rate as the cost of borrowing. The estimated coeffi-
cient is positive and significant, also consistent with theoretical predictions
on the costs of inputs.
State and month specific unemployment rates were used as a proxy for
demand conditions. Coefficients in all specifications are positive and signifi-
cant, supporting the theory that in poor demand conditions collusion is more
likely. Since I use unemployment rates that are not seasonally adjusted, I
do not include seasonal fixed effects. Also, the unemployment rates vary
greatly by state, which absorbs to large extent the states’ heterogeneity.
Two binary variables chosen as proxies for the number of firms in the
market are the ‘central city’ and ‘metropolitan/not central city’ variables,
compared against rural area observations. As anticipated, collusion is the
greatest in rural areas where employer coordination is the easiest, it is
smaller in towns, and the smallest in large cities where coordination is the
most difficult. The coefficients have expected signs and significant in all
specifications.
Minimum wage and real minimum wage variables are introduced in spec-
ifications 2–5 show that a relatively more binding minimum wage reduces
the number of workers affected by collusive wage-setting: the estimated co-
efficients are negative and significant. It reiterates the hypothesis that the
recent minimum wage hikes were not binding, were able to increase wages
and reduced the extent of collusion.
The last variable in the probit equations is the dummy denoting worker’s
employment in a state with the federal minimum. Viewing this variable as
a proxy for the stability of the focal point and the associated possibility for
learning to cooperate can explain the positive (and significant) coefficient.
It also informs that workers in theses states during the covered period were
more likely affected. The coefficient also points out that the estimation of
the ‘cause’ collusion measure by ML truncated regressions is, perhaps, more
appropriate than p-Tobit.
In summary, the results of the probit models provide strong statistical
and theoretically meaningful evidence in support of the collusion hypothesis.
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7 Conclusion
This paper was an attempt to explain some interesting empirical phenomena
found in low-wage labor markets. Perhaps, the most visible among them
is the minimum wage spike puzzle. By combining industrial organization
theories of tacit collusion and focal points with labor market analysis, this
paper broadens the range of possible explanations of the spike and points out
a new role that the minimum wage plays in the low-wage markets. Namely,
I suggest that in the infinite game of wage-setting employers are likely to
tacitly collude if offered a focal point – the non-binding minimum wage.
The outcome, a stable but socially inefficient collusive equilibrium, results
on monopsony-like labor markets.
The collusion hypothesis is tested empirically by analyzing the empirical
implications of tacit collusion in the form of lowered wages, their cluster-
ing, and their responsiveness to the facilitating factors. The results provide
strong indication that the tacit collusion affects the low-wage markets. Both
truncated and p-Tobit regressions show that the fraction of low-wage work-
ers affected by collusive wage-setting rises when the minimum wage is raised,
however the results also indicate that some workers benefit since their pre-
viously collusive wages are now closer to the competitive levels.
Regressions also demonstrate that propensity to collude is consistent
with predictions of the IO theory of facilitating factors. All three models
point towards existence of strategic behavior by employers, with workers in
the subset of states that follow the federal minimum wage regulation being
more affected during the investigated period.
Thus, the paper unravels the sequence of questions posed in the intro-
duction. If current level of minimum wage is non-binding for employers
who happen to tacitly collude, an increase to another non-binding level will
increase overall wages and will have no effect on employment. Successful col-
lusion makes employers earn extra-marginal profits, contributing to higher
than average rate of job creation in the low-wage sectors, frequently observed
in the data. By assuming collusion, one can also understand why low-wage
employers are unwilling to raise wages even when unable to hire workers –
because of the threat of retaliation. And importantly, collusion can play an
important role in explaining slow growth in earnings of the low-wage workers
and resulting rise in the wage inequality.
As the results indicate, a higher minimum wage has both negative and
the positive effect on collusion, and these marginal effects should be taken
into account when minimum wage policies are formulated. It should not be
assumed that by simply raising the minimum wage the problem of collusion
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at the minimum will be eliminated. For a policy-maker, raising the minimum
wage poses two questions. First, at what value it should be set, which calls
for the search of a just-binding level. The choice of such a level could,
however, be a double-edged sword: a uniform minimum wage will likely
be binding for some industries, resulting in layoffs, and non-binding for
others, contributing to collusion. And, as the paper suggests, the non-
binding minimum could become the focal minimum. From this perspective,
one can argue that an industry-specific or a locality-specific minimum wage
should be preferred to the uniform minimum wage.
The second question that a policy-maker addresses is how often an ex-
isting minimum wage should be raised. If collusion at the non-binding mini-
mum wage is real, it calls for more frequent changes in its levels. However, if
these changes are anticipated, it would not alleviate the collusion problem.
Moreover, if the coming hikes in the minimum wage (and their magnitudes)
is known in advance, it is equivalent to having a stable focal point, and the
wage-lifting effect will be minimal.
As tacit collusion by wage-setting employers at the non-binding mini-
mum wage is a very likely state that the low-wage markets are in, the reader
should be cautioned that the evidence I present in the paper is indirect
(though tacit collusion is hard to prove in general). There can be pointed
out at least two ways that could improve upon the results and get more
immediate evidence of collusion. First, obtaining a joint employer-employee
dataset that included a set of variables describing firms’ size, sales, costs,
profits, hiring and firing activity would allow to establish a more direct link
between firm’s performance and collusion. No publicly available dataset in
the US (and to my knowledge no administrative set either) has such com-
bination of variables. Second, having a control group of markets that is
not affected by the minimum wage regulations would also allow for better
identification of the relationship. As was previously discussed, such control
groups are rather difficult to locate when using the US data. A possible
solution lies in investigating the possibilities of using foreign data.
Overall, the research suggests the role that a non-binding minimum wage
plays as a possible focal point for tacit collusion by employers should be
taken into account by policy-makers who design labor market policies aimed
at improving earnings of the low paid. The redistributive efficacy of the
minimum wage is jeopardized if it becomes the reference point for collusion,
and should be further analyzed.
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                              Appendix 1 
Minimum Wage: State and Federal Increases (1990‐2005) 
     1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
  Apr  Apr  Sep  Jan AK 
3.35  4.30  4.75            5.65            7.15     
       Mar  Mar  Jan  Jan 
CA 
4.25                 5.00  5.75      6.25  6.75       
     Apr  Oct  Sep  Jan  Jan  Jan  Jan  Jan  Jan 
CT 
4.25    4.27          4.27    5.18  5.65  6.15  6.40  6.70  6.90  7.10   
    Mar  May  Oct   
DE 
3.35                5.00    5.65  6.15           
    Oct  Jan  Jan 
DC 
4.75        5.45            6.15            6.60 
    May 
FL 
3.35                                6.15 
    Jan  Jan  Jan 
HI 
3.85        5.25                  5.75  6.25     
    Jan  Jan  Jan 
IA 
3.35    4.25  4.65                    5.75       
    Jan  Jan 
IL 
3.35                              5.50  6.50 
    Jan  Jan  Jan  Jan  Oct 
MA 
3.75              4.75  5.25      6.00  6.75        6.50 
  Jan  Jan    Jan  Oct 
ME 
3.75  3.85  3.95                        6.25  6.35   
  Jan    Aug 
MN 
3.85  3.95                              6.15 
      Apr  Oct 
NJ 
3.35      5.05                          6.15 
  Jan  Jan  Jan                           
NH 
3.65  3.75  3.85  3.95                           
      Jan 
NY 
3.35                                6.00 
  Jan  Jan  Jan  Jan  Jan  Jan  Jan  Jan 
OR 
3.85  4.25  4.75            5.50  6.00  6.50        6.90  7.05  7.25 
     Jul  Sep  Jan 
RI 
4.25                     5.65  6.15        6.75   
  Jul    Feb  Feb  Jan  Oct  Jan  Jan  Jan 
VT 
3.75  3.85          4.50  4.75  5.00    5.75    6.25      6.75  7.00 
  Jan    Jan  Jan  Jan  Jan  Jan  Jan  Jan  Jan 
WA 
3.85  4.25          4.90        5.70  6.50  6.72  6.90  7.01  7.16  7.35 
     Mar  Jun 
WI 
3.35       4.25                          5.70 
  Apr  Apr  Oct  Sep US 
3.35  3.80  4.25              4.75  5.15                         
        Sources: 
       US Department of Labor 
       Monthly Labor Review: 1989‐2006 
       Fiscal Policy Institute: http://www.fiscalpolicy.org, 2006 
 
 Appendix 2 
List of Regressors,  Wage Equation 
Demographic variables  Age 
Age squared 
Male 
Married, spouse present  
Black 
Hispanic 
Foreign born 
Not a citizen 
Educational groups  Less than 8th grade 
High school grades completed, no diploma 
High school graduate1 
Some college 
Associate’s degree 
Bachelors degree 
Master’s degree 
Professional degree 
Doctorate degree 
Time allocation variables  Part‐time labor force 
Enrolled in school 
Cost‐of‐living and local labor market conditions  Metropolitan area 
State dummies 
Industry dummies  Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting 
Mining 
Construction 
Manufacturing 
Transportation 
Communications 
Utilities and sanitary services 
Wholesale trade  
Retail  
Finance, insurance and real estate 
Private households 
Business, repair, auto personal services 
Entertainment and recreation services 
Hospitals and other medical services 
Educational, social other professional services 
Forestry and fisheries 
Public administration  
(Armed forces excluded) 
Occupation group dummies  Executive, administrative and managerial 
Professional specialty 
Technicians and related support 
Sales 
Administrative support, inc. clerical  
Private household  
Protective service 
Service occ., except protective and household 
Precisionn production, craft and repair 
Machine operators, assemblers and inspectors 
Transportation and material moving 
Handlers, equip. cleaners, helpers, laborers  
Farming, forestry and fishing occ. 
(Armed forces excluded) 
Other work related variables  Union member / covered by union contract  
Appendix 3a
Percentage of Potentially Collusive Observations at MW(+50c), "Effect" Measure
Subset of States Federeal MW
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Avg.
jan    21.5    19.2    12.0    14.0    14.4    16.8    20.1    12.2    15.5    15.1    13.0    17.6    23.3    21.6    32.5    36.9    19.1 
feb    20.0    10.2    10.7      9.8    19.1    16.6    21.0    17.5    16.2    18.1    17.9    22.1    29.8    32.0    34.3    28.3    20.2 
mar    15.7    13.5      9.3      8.7    12.5    22.1    27.3    19.3    16.3    14.0    24.2    23.0    25.5    26.8    28.4    30.7    19.8 
apr    18.0    17.4      9.8    10.2    12.4    20.8    18.7    13.4    15.2    13.8    14.1    25.3    17.3    23.6    40.2    33.9    19.0 
may    14.4    10.5    14.9    10.9    13.0    15.6    12.5    21.2    15.6    19.4    25.3    24.2    21.7    23.6    34.3    28.2    19.1 
jun    17.2    11.2    11.6    11.2    16.2    25.3    16.9    25.0    18.9    20.0    25.8    26.1    37.2    27.4    30.6    39.8    22.5 
jul    15.8      7.5    10.4    10.0    15.5    18.9    26.2    25.2    16.4    25.8    24.7    19.6    26.9    31.6    25.1    26.8    20.4 
aug    14.0    11.0    10.0      9.4    26.7    18.2    23.6    20.2    17.5    11.3    18.0    27.5    23.0    32.9    36.9    25.5    20.3 
sep    14.0    10.1      8.3    11.1    10.8    10.3    17.8    11.6    20.3    17.2    15.6    22.3    25.9    23.8    25.6    20.0    16.5 
oct    11.3      8.0      9.8      9.4    15.9    17.9    16.9    13.3    13.7    14.6    14.9    20.5    29.9    27.1    38.6    34.8    18.5 
nov    12.6      7.6      8.5      9.1    15.9    17.5    16.9    11.5    10.7    15.0    13.5    24.9    24.2    25.1    34.6    29.6    17.3 
dec    11.0      8.9      7.5      7.0    14.9    11.7    11.1    12.0    11.3    18.4    17.4    15.1    30.1    17.5    33.1    24.3    15.7 
Avg.    15.4    11.3    10.2    10.1    15.6    17.6    19.1    16.9    15.6    16.9    18.7    22.3    26.2    26.1    32.9    29.9    19.1 
Subset of States with Own MW
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Avg.
jan    16.3    12.3    21.3    10.0    16.8    17.5    17.7    14.3    17.2    25.9    16.1    28.4    17.9    12.4    22.5    25.5    18.3 
feb    20.0    11.0    13.9    12.0    24.6    28.1    25.1    20.6    11.7    18.2    15.3    13.2    18.2    13.9    29.4    20.2    18.5 
mar    19.4    14.3    10.6    10.9    19.0    20.2    32.1    14.8    19.5    13.3    26.5    11.5    30.4    23.0    24.6    21.3    19.5 
apr    21.0    10.4    11.9      9.3    11.9    20.7    24.2    16.1    19.1    19.3    14.6    15.5      6.8    16.1    30.1    20.2    16.7 
may    10.6    18.4    13.9    20.0      9.7    20.5    19.1    16.5    19.9    17.3    19.7    15.1    25.8    25.4    25.4    27.1    19.0 
jun    19.4    11.5      9.5    12.4    19.3    30.3    25.5    28.9    19.6    19.9    26.3    18.5    21.6    19.4    25.0    19.0    20.4 
jul    17.7    15.8    15.7    15.9    19.9    12.2    26.0    20.4    11.9    31.7    22.3    22.2    24.4    36.1    26.8    22.7    21.4 
aug    15.8    16.5    19.9    10.1    25.2    25.5    35.8    28.6    20.5    14.1    23.1    24.6    21.9    24.5    24.0    21.8    22.0 
sep    12.9    10.2      6.7    11.1    18.7    21.2    18.7    13.1    21.8    23.9    19.0    22.5    26.7    18.3    14.3    15.6    17.2 
oct    17.3      9.8    12.5    12.9    18.2    26.1    21.5    13.0    13.3    18.6    22.7    19.5    31.4    20.2    24.8    14.1    18.5 
nov    20.3    14.2      6.7    10.5    24.9    19.8    22.8    13.8    13.1    20.7    23.6    12.7    25.3    29.0    26.6    28.3    19.5 
dec    22.0      9.8    14.3      7.4    20.7    25.6    19.7    21.8    10.3    19.7    15.7    20.4    32.5    30.2    27.6    15.5    19.6 
Avg.    17.7    12.9    13.1    11.9    19.1    22.3    24.0    18.5    16.5    20.2    20.4    18.7    23.6    22.4    25.1    20.9    19.2 
Appendix 3b
Potentially Collusive Observations at MW(+50c) Within First Quartile of Hourly Wages, "Cause" Measure
Subset of States Federeal MW
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Avg.
jan      5.7      7.3      5.5      5.8      5.2      3.9      4.8      5.2      5.8      4.4      2.0      2.4      2.6      1.6      2.3      2.8      4.2 
feb      5.4      3.5      4.3      4.4      7.3      5.9      4.9      6.8      5.4      4.6      3.9      2.6      3.3      3.4      2.6      2.4      4.4 
mar      3.9      4.8      3.8      3.5      4.8      3.6      5.7      8.3      5.1      3.4      4.5      2.5      2.8      2.9      2.1      1.9      4.0 
apr      6.6      5.4      3.7      3.4      4.8      3.9      4.4      5.0      5.4      3.7      2.2      2.9      1.5      2.5      3.2      2.7      3.8 
may      6.2      4.7      6.7      4.2      5.0      4.7      2.4      6.2      5.4      4.8      4.0      2.6      1.9      2.1      2.8      1.9      4.1 
jun      6.2      4.5      4.3      4.2      4.6      5.2      3.4      7.9      4.7      3.9      4.3      2.6      3.3      2.3      2.4      2.8      4.2 
jul      5.2      3.1      3.9      3.4      4.1      1.9      5.2      7.7      4.3      6.9      3.8      1.8      2.3      2.6      1.6      2.2      3.8 
aug      4.4      4.5      3.1      3.0      7.4      4.8      4.2      5.8      4.5      1.7      2.2      2.9      2.5      3.1      2.6      1.9      3.6 
sep      5.3      4.3      3.6      3.2      3.1      3.0      2.9      3.6      6.2      3.1      2.1      2.1      2.5      2.0      1.8      1.3      3.1 
oct      4.5      3.9      3.9      2.8      4.1      3.9      6.6      4.2      3.6      2.9      1.9      2.3      2.8      2.5      3.8      2.4      3.5 
nov      5.0      3.7      3.8      3.5      4.8      4.2      6.6      4.7      3.0      3.4      2.0      2.4      2.4      2.3      2.9      2.2      3.5 
dec      5.3      4.8      3.4      3.0      3.9      4.7      4.4      4.1      3.2      3.6      1.9      1.8      2.8      1.5      2.9      2.1      3.3 
Avg.      5.3      4.5      4.1      3.7      4.9      4.2      4.6      5.8      4.7      3.9      2.9      2.4      2.5      2.4      2.6      2.2      3.8 
Subset of States with Own MW
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Avg.
jan      2.8      1.8      4.7      2.3      3.9      3.9      2.5      4.2      4.7      6.4      2.8      4.0      3.0      1.5      2.7      3.0      3.4 
feb      3.3      2.1      3.8      3.4      4.8      5.9      3.9      6.4      3.4      4.0      3.3      2.3      2.5      1.5      4.6      2.8      3.6 
mar      4.3      3.1      3.1      2.7      4.0      3.6      4.9      4.4      4.5      3.7      5.0      2.1      4.2      3.7      3.2      3.2      3.7 
apr      5.4      3.9      3.1      2.1      2.5      3.9      3.8      5.4      5.0      3.9      3.0      2.1      1.1      2.2      4.0      3.6      3.5 
may      2.2      3.8      3.0      4.0      1.9      4.7      3.3      4.1      6.6      4.4      3.6      1.8      4.0      2.7      3.3      4.4      3.6 
jun      4.1      2.6      2.5      2.6      4.5      5.2      3.7      9.1      4.7      4.2      4.6      2.7      3.2      2.8      3.5      3.2      4.0 
jul      3.3      3.5      3.4      4.0      3.6      1.9      4.2      5.3      2.8      6.9      2.8      2.4      3.8      5.0      4.4      4.2      3.8 
aug      2.0      3.0      4.7      2.4      4.2      4.8      5.0      6.3      5.4      3.2      4.1      2.8      3.2      3.3      2.9      4.1      3.8 
sep      2.6      2.6      1.8      2.9      3.5      3.0      3.3      3.4      6.7      4.4      3.5      2.9      4.2      2.4      2.0      2.7      3.2 
oct      3.5      2.7      3.3      3.0      4.0      3.9      5.8      3.3      3.6      3.9      3.1      2.8      5.2      3.3      2.9      2.4      3.5 
nov      4.7      3.5      1.6      2.1      5.7      4.2      6.9      3.6      3.0      4.3      2.9      1.6      3.5      3.1      3.5      4.1      3.6 
dec      4.4      2.8      3.4      1.6      4.8      4.7      7.3      5.2      2.4      3.7      2.6      2.5      4.5      3.8      3.6      2.5      3.7 
Avg.      3.6      2.9      3.2      2.8      3.9      4.2      4.5      5.1      4.4      4.4      3.4      2.5      3.5      2.9      3.4      3.3      3.6 
